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This study aims at estimating the effect of traveling and waiting times on 
patients’ choice of emergency care provider. In a model with no outside 
option, patients choose to demand emergency care from one of two similar 
hospitals. Using data from two Portuguese public hospitals, a conditional 
logit model is estimated. Two measures of waiting times are considered: the 
waiting time between admission and triage and the waiting time between 
triage and the first medical observation. A negative, statistically significant, 
impact of traveling time and waiting time between triage and the first medical 
observation on the probability of choosing a given hospital is found. The 
magnitude of the effect of waiting time, however, is close to zero. The 
estimated marginal effect suggests that a supply-induced 30-minutes increase 
in waiting time reduces, all else equal, the probability of choosing a given 
hospital by 0.009 percentage points. An increase of the same magnitude in 
traveling time reduces, all else equal, the probability of utilization by 5.841. 
Although the data does not allow for the estimation of consumer surplus, and 
given that the estimated effect captures only the impact of changes in waiting 
times resulting from supply side decisions, it is plausible to admit their effect 
on patient welfare would be small.  
 





Este estudo procura estimar o efeito do tempo de deslocação e de espera na 
escolha de serviços de urgência por parte dos pacientes. Num modelo sem 
uma outside option, os utentes escolhem entre dois serviços de urgência de 
dois hospitais semelhantes. Utilizando dados de dois hospitais públicos 
Portugueses, um modelo logit condicional é estimado. Duas medidas de 
tempo de espera são consideradas: o tempo de espera entre a admissão e 
triagem e o tempo de espera entre a triagem e a primeira observação. Os 
resultados sugerem a existência de um efeito negativo, estatisticamente 
significativo, dos tempos de deslocação e de espera entre a triagem e a 
primeira observação na probabilidade de um paciente escolher determinado 
hospital. No entanto, a magnitude do efeito dos tempos de espera é próximo 
de zero. O efeito marginal estimado de um aumento de 30 minutos induzido 
pelo lado da oferta na probabilidade de escolher um dado hospital é, tudo o 
resto constante, -0,009 pontos percentuais. Um aumento de igual magnitude 
no tempo de deslocação reduz, tudo o resto constante, aquela probabilidade 
em 5,481 pontos percentuais. Apesar de os dados não permitirem a estimação 
do excedente do consumidor, e dado que o efeito estimado captura apenas o 
impacto de variações nos tempos de espera causados por decisões de oferta, é 
razoável concluir que estas não tenham um impacto significativo no 
bem-estar dos pacientes no caso dos serviços de urgência.  
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1. Introduction  
Health care is consensually perceived as being distinct from other goods, 
mainly because of its ethical implications, which makes the evaluation of 
health care provision an extremely delicate matter. In a seminal contribution, 
Arrow (1963) addressed a number of aspects that distinguish the market for 
health care from the markets for other commodities  
One of the distinctive features of health care markets is the role of the 
monetary price consumers face. The presence of insurance and/or the 
existence of tax-funded national health servicesas is the case of several 
western countriesusually dampen the monetary costs consumers incur at 
the time of purchase. Therefore, the instrument that is used in most markets 
to curb demandthe monetary priceis often unavailable to providers and 
policy makers in health care markets.1 This gives rise to an increase in the 
relative importance of non-monetary costs, among which time plays a 
predominant role, as determinants of demand and as a public policy tools. 
Waiting timesbroadly defined as the period of time between the moment in 
which patients, or an agent on their behalf, like a physician, demand the 
medical good and the moment in which it is suppliedaffect treatment 
outcomes and efficiency, thus, shaping investment and capacity decisions. In 
the case of emergency care and due to its short-term nature, such effect is 
often amplified. 
Whether waiting times are viewed as a result of insufficient capacity, or an 
instrument that aligns supply and demand, hence bringing health care 
markets to an equilibrium like prices do in markets for other private goods, 
they are highly likely to enter patients’ utility functions.2 Economic theory 
                                                 
1 For example, Duarte (2012), using data for Chile, finds demand elasticities for acute health care close to 
zero.   
2 See, for exemple, Siciliani (2008) and Brekke et al. (2008) for dynamic and static discussions along 
those lines.  
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predicts that an increase in the waiting time in health care emergency services 
has a negative impact on the demand for these services and, hence, in the 
welfare of users.  
The main purpose of this study is to analyze the effects of provider specific 
factors (among which travel and waiting time are deemed of special interest) 
on patient emergency care choice. Using data from two major general 
hospitals in the city of Porto, Portugal, a discrete-choice demand model for 
emergency services is estimated by Maximum Likelihood. The results show 
that waiting times have a negative and significant effect on the probability of 
a given hospital being chosen, but very modest in size. The estimated 
marginal effect suggests that a supply-induced 30-minute increase in waiting 
time reduces, all else equal, the probability of choosing a given hospital by 
0.009 percentage points. As far as the traveling time is concerned, the 
estimated marginal effect implies a 5.581 decrease in the probability of 
choosing a given hospital, all else equal. 
The remaining of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
related literature, devoting particular attention to the Portuguese case. 
Sections 3 and 4 present, respectively, the random utility choice framework 
and the estimation procedure. Section 5 offers an institutional description of 
public health care provision in Portugal. Section 6 presents the dataset and 
conceptually discusses the construction of the explanatory variables in the 
econometric model, and provides first attempt to understand the link 
between waiting times and choice. Section 7 reports the results and accesses 







2. Literature Review 
Demand for health care and time costs are the subject of a significant body of 
both theoretical and empirical literature.   
The idea that in order to produce a set of commodities individuals must 
combine inputs of market goods and their own time was first purposed by 
Becker (1965). He introduced time consumed as a cost to the individual and 
presented a theory of the allocation of time between different activities. This 
framework was then applied to the health care market by Grossman (1972). In 
a model of the demand for health and medical care, patients produce health 
by combining two inputs: time and medical care. Medical care consumption 
is, thus, associated with both a monetary costthe price of the medical 
goodand a nonmonetary onetime. 
In the presence of insurance, the relative importance of the monetary cost is 
dampened. Since health care consumption requires a substantial expense in 
terms of time, the lower the coinsurance, the lower the monetary price 
patients have to bear, which implies that the time price becomes relatively 
more important. This idea was explored by Newhouse and Phelps (1974), 
who investigated the link between insurance and the relative importance of 
the time price and found empirical evidence that lower coinsurance rates 
were indeed associated with higher time elasticities of demand. Another 
important contribution may be found in the work of Cauley (1987), which 
corroborates the findings of Newhouse and Phelps (1974). His results suggest 
that increases in the time requirement and in the monetary price have a 
negative effect on demand, which is consistent with a priori expectations. 
Further, he also suggested that the time price is a large fraction of the total 
cost patients incur when seeking treatment, which indicates that patients 
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normally place a high marginal value on the time required in health care 
consumption.  
Acton (1976) expanded this idea further, by dividing the total cost of health 
care into monetary price, the amount of time between arriving at the provider 
office and being treatedwaiting time, and the travelling time.3 He studied 
the effects of each of these costs on the demand for health care. The main 
purpose of the study was to find if time prices would be an appropriate 
mechanism for controlling demand as the monetary price decreased in the 
presence of insurance.4 Using a utility maximization model, he concluded that 
nonmonetary factors, as time, act as prices in discouraging demand. The 
results for two separate samples yielded negative own-elasticities of demand 
with respect to both travelling and waiting times for outpatient departments 
and for private physician visits, supporting the idea that time is a suitable 
instrument for controlling demand. The point estimates for the elasticities all 
smaller than one in absolute value suggest that the demand for health care at 
those types of providers is inelastic with respect to time, though. 
In line with Acton (1976) is the later work of Martínez-Garcia et al. (1998). 
Their formulation is akin to that of Acton (1976), since it considers the 
opportunity cost of traveling and waiting times in the budget constraint as if 
they were monetary prices. They analyze the elements that influence patients’ 
choice between provider alternatives in the Spanish health system, placing 
special emphasis on traveling and waiting times. The results revealed that 
emergency services demand is very sensitive to time costs. In fact, they 
concluded that the demand for emergency services is more elastic than the 
                                                 
3 In an attempt to study the impact of travelling time in determining the demand for medical services in 
New York City, Acton (1975) used the travelling distance as a proxy for the travelling time. 
4  Brekke et al. (2008) present a model of hospital competition in which hospitals avoid treating 
unprofitable patients by increasing waiting times. 
Blundell and Windmeijer (2000) present a model in which waiting time acts as a cost to treatment and is 
sufficient to reduce demand to equal supply – if there is an increase in demand, waiting times will 
increase, causing some individuals to drop out, which will reduce the waiting times.  
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demand for specialist services and the demand for appointments with general 
practitioners. 
The set of approaches addressed so far might also be applied to the case of the 
Portuguese National Health Service, under which copayments amount only 
to a very small part of true service cost and, therefore, where the relative 
importance of the monetary cost is reduced. In fact, some attention has been 
given to the link between increases in copayments and health care demand in 
Portugal, with the evidence suggesting that the former are somewhat 
ineffective in controlling the latter. Using data from an undisclosed Lisbon 
hospital, Afonso et al. (2013) concluded that copayments are not an important 
barrier in the access to health care, although they discourage the utilization of 
emergency care by patients with milder health conditions. 5  Almeida and 
Ramos (2015) analyzed the effect of an increase in both direct and indirect 
costs on the demand for emergency services in Portugal and reported that 
emergency services demand was not significantly affected by the increase in 
copayments, while the change in transport regulation had a substantial 
impact on demand. Their results support the view that indirect costs may be 
more important than direct costs in determining healthcare when copayments 
are small and exemption schemes are available.  
For Portugal there is no equivalent to the work of Acton (1976), associating 
demand for health care and the total time cost. Actual distance is alternatively 
used as a proxy for traveling time, and waiting times as defined above are not 
considered. Examples of this approach may be found in Santana (1996) and 
Oliveira (2004). The former attempts to evaluate whether hospital utilization 
is decreasing in the distance between the patient’s residence and the hospital. 
                                                 
5 These findings were corroborated by a study on the impact of the 2012 increase in user fees in the 
Portuguese National Health System conducted by Entidade Reguladora da Saúde, the Portuguese 
Health Regulator. According to the report, the increase in user fees were accompanied by a reduction in 
the utilization of both exempt and non-exempt patients, ruling out the former as the cause of the latter. 
There was, however, an increase in the share of acute cases in the total number of emergency episodes, 
which suggests that emergency services demand by low severity patients was hindered. 
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Her results are consistent with Acton’s (1975) findings since an increase in 
distance has a negative influence on demand. She also found that this 
influence is greater for emergency services visits, which is in line with the 
work of Martínez-Garcia et al. (1998). The latter develops a demand model for 
hospital care in which demand is a function of the distance the patient has to 
travel to get to the hospital. The empirical analysis shows that patients that 
are located further away from the hospital have a lower probability of 
utilization, supporting the rationale that the distance a patient has to travel, 
and hence the traveling time, and the demand for medical services are 
negatively correlated.  
Contrary evidence is presented by Lourenço and Ferreira (2005), whose 
findings indicate that time is not a determinant of demand for public health 
centers in Portugal. Lourenço and Ferreira’s (2005) findings refute the 
argument that time costs are relevant in determining demand. They 
concluded that utilization is highly inelastic to the total time spent at the 
health care center and that the elasticity of demand with respect to the 
traveling time is actually positive. They argue that these results can be 
explained by the characteristics of the health center users and the health 
centers distribution across the country. 
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3. Theoretical Framework 
In order to answer the research question I follow Matinez-Garcia et al. (1998). 
I model patient choice between two alternativesemergency care from 
Hospital a or Hospital b. The utility derived from getting treatment at either 
hospital is not observed, only the actual choice is. Thus, the observed choice 
between the two hospitals reveals which of the alternatives provides greater 
utility. In other words, the observed outcome reveals how the patient ranks 
the two alternatives. Both the patient’s and the hospitals’ observable and 
unobservable characteristics affect the utility derived from emergency care 
consumption at each one of the hospitals and, accordingly, influence the 
choice between them. 
Let 𝑈𝑖𝑎  and 𝑈𝑖𝑏  represent patient i’s utility from choosing hospital a and 
hospital b, respectively: 
 
 𝑈𝑖𝑎 = 𝒛𝑖𝑎′ T+ 𝜀𝑖𝑎, (1) 
 
where 𝒛𝑖𝑗, j = a,b, includes characteristics specific to the patient as well as to 
the choices. Let 𝒛𝑖𝑗  = [𝒙𝑖𝑗, 𝒘𝑖]  and T  = [ 𝜷′, 𝜶′] . The vector 𝒙𝑖𝑗 denotes the 
attributes of the hospitals and, thus, varies across choices and possibly across 
patients as well. 𝒘𝑖 contains the characteristics of the patient and is, therefore, 
the same for the two hospitals. Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑎 and 𝜀𝑖𝑏  represent the stochastic 
elements that are specific to patients and hospital and known only by the 
individual.6 
Following Martínez-García et al. (1998), 𝒘𝑖 comprises variables like gender, 
age, whether or not the patient is exempt from copayments, and the severity 
of the patient’s condition (health status). The vector 𝒙𝑖𝑗 includes, for example, 
                                                 
6 This model is a version of a model presented by Green (2000), chapter 18.  
 𝑈𝑖𝑏 = 𝒛𝑖𝑏′ T+ 𝜀𝑖𝑏, (2) 
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the traveling time patients face to go to the hospital, the waiting time at the 
hospital, and its capacity. Travelling and waiting times are the non-monetary 
cost patients must incur when seeking care. Hence, it is expected that longer 
waiting times and a more distant location are associated with a lower 
probability of utilization of a given hospital. 
Aiming at examining the effect of hospital-specific attributes—namely, 
traveling and waiting times—, the conditional logit model is adopted. Its link 
with utility maximization is as follows. Let 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑎 represent patient 𝑖’s choice 
of hospital a and 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑏  patient 𝑖 ’s choice of hospital b. Observing 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑎 
implies that patient i retrieves  greater utility from option a. That is, 𝑈𝑖𝑎 > 𝑈𝑖𝑏. 
With 𝜀𝑖𝑗independentely and identically distributed according to the type 1 
extreme value distribution, the probability that each hospital is chosen is 
given by: 
 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑎) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑈𝑖𝑎 > 𝑈𝑖𝑏) =
exp(𝒙𝑖𝑎′ 𝜷 + 𝒘𝑖′𝛼)
∑ exp(𝒙𝑖𝑗′ 𝜷 + 𝒘𝑖′𝛼)𝑏𝑗=𝑎
, (3) 
and 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑏) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑈𝑖𝑏 > 𝑈𝑖𝑎) =
exp(𝒙𝑖𝑏′ 𝜷 + 𝒘𝑖′𝛼)
∑ exp(𝒙𝑖𝑗′ 𝜷 + 𝒘𝑖′𝛼)𝑏𝑗=𝑎
. (4) 
 
As Green (2012) notes, the terms that are specific to the patient fall out of the 
probability, which is expected in a model that compares the utilities of the 
alternatives. Equation (3) and (4) then simplify to: 
 











Following Sivey (2012), an outside option, which could represent the choice to 
go private or forgo treatment, is not included in the model. It is assumed that 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 is sufficiently high enough at one of the hospitals for the patient to always 
seek treatment, which implies a fixed overall demand for treatment, with the 
model coefficients determining the choice between the two hospitals. As in 
Sivey (2012), this may be interpreted as a model for the second stage in a 
two-stage decision process, where the patient firstly decides whether or not to 




4. Econometric Procedure  
In order to estimate 𝜷, I follow the maximum likelihood approach. The choice 
between hospitals a and b of each of 𝑛 patients is treated as a single draw from 
a Bernoulli distribution. Given the data for the 𝑛 independent observations, 
the joint probability function, or likelihood function, is given by: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌1 = 𝑦1, … , 𝑌𝑛 = 𝑦𝑛|𝒙) = 𝐿(𝜷|𝒙) = ∏ ∏ [𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗)]𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑏𝑗=𝑎𝑛𝑖=1 , (7) 
 
where 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is an indicator equal to one if hospital 𝑗 is chosen by patient 𝑖. 
Therefore, the log of choice probabilities over hospitals and patients takes the 
form of the log-likelihood: 
 


















5. Portuguese National Health System 
The Portuguese National Health System (SNS) is universal, comprehensive 
and almost free at the point of use. In addition to it, citizens may benefit from 
additional insurance coverage in the form of public health subsystems, 
private health subsystems, and voluntary health insurance.  
The SNS is predominantly financed through taxation, although out-of-pocket 
expenditures exist in the form of copayments, which are charged for services 
ranging from consultation to emergency visits and differ with the level of 
care. 7 They are defined as a fixed amount charged for a service, and their core 
objective is to regulate demand for public services. Copayments in the SNS 
correspond only to a small share of the total cost of service. For instance, in 
2015 the copayment in polyvalent emergency services was €20.60 but the total 
cost was estimated to be €112.07, roughly 8.4%.8   In the SNS as a whole, as of 
2012, copayments amounted to approximately 1.69% of total NHS revenue, 
according to the Portuguese Health Regulator (Entidade Reguladora da 
Saúde – ERS).9 Furthermore, 6.136.188 citizens, 59% of the population, are 
exempt from copayments. 10 
In the Portuguese Emergency Network, emergency services are classified 
according to the complexity of the cases they are qualified to treated and the 
availability of resources as polyvalent, medical-surgical and basic. 11  The 
polyvalent emergency services are endowed with a greater number of 
medical specialties and equipped with more resources, corresponding to the 
                                                 
7 Decreto-lei n.º 117/2014 (2014.Ago.05). DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA: I SÉRIE. n.º 149 pp. 4065-4069 
8 Circular Normativa da ACSS N.º1/2015/DPS/ACSS and Portaria n.º 234/2015 (2015.Ago.07) DIÁRIO 
DA REPÚBLICA: I SÉRIE. n.º 153 pp. 5516-5654 
9  O Novo Regime Jurídico das Taxas Moderadoras, Entidade Reguladora da Saúde, available at 
https://www.ers.pt/uploads/writer_file/document/892/Estudo_Taxas_Moderadoras.pdf (2016/05/11; 
15H44M) 
10  Administração Central do Sistema de Saúde, IP. 2016. Taxas moderadoras. Available at 
http://www.acss.min-saude.pt/Publicações/TabelaseImpressos/TaxasModeradoras/tabid/142/language/
pt-PT/Default.aspx  (2016/08/13; 15H05M) 
11 Despacho n.º 10319/2014 (2014.Ago.11) DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA: II SÉRIE. n.º 153 pp. 20673-20678 
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more differentiated level of response to situations of emergency. 
Medical-surgical emergency services are at an intermediate level, referring to 
the polyvalent emergency services patients that require more specialized care. 
Basic emergency services treat only patients with milder conditions, directing 
the more severe cases to further differentiated hospitals in their referral 
network.  
In Portuguese hospitals, emergency services are obliged to announce in the 
entrance the number of patients and a measure of the waiting time between 
triage and the first medical examination for each Manchester Triage System 
(MTS) classification. The methodology adopted to estimate the waiting time is 
the arithmetic mean of all emergency care episodes that took place in the 
previous two hours until the moment of update. The estimate is updated 
every five minutes.12   
                                                 
12  For further information see http://tempos.min-saude.pt/#/info (2016/11/06;15H49) 
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6. Empirical Application 
6.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data was retrieved from the ALERT£ database of the polyvalent 
emergency services of two public Portuguese hospitals located in the city of 
Porto. The original dataset was comprised of 23,680 observations, referring to 
all the patients aged 18 and over who sought emergency care at either 
hospital during the month of April 2016. For each observation, information 
regarding the hospital from which emergency care was demanded, the date, 
the patient’s age, gender, copayment exemption status, classification of the 
MTScolor of the bracelet, and parish of residence, the time between 
admission and triage, and the time between triage and the first medical 
examination was obtained.13 
Following the discussion of the previous section and in order to ensure that 
only patients who actually chose to seek treatment from one of the two 
alternatives were included in the sample, only patient initiated contacts are 
considered. This implies that patients who had been referred from other 
providers were excluded from the sample, as well as those who had been 
transported by ambulance. Patients living outside the Porto district were also 
removed to control for situations in which emergency treatment was 
demanded by patients that would not normally chose any of the hospitals due 
to their residencethis includes, for example, the case of individuals visiting 
the region at the time of demand. Finally, observations for which there were 
missing values for any of the variables were excluded, as well as those for 
which waiting times displayed negative values, probably due to errors in the 
introduction of the data.   
                                                 
13 Grupo Português de Triagem. 2016. Sistema de Triagem de Manchester. Available at 
http://www.grupoportuguestriagem.pt/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4&Itemid=11
0 (2016/08/13; 14H57M) 
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After these changes, the sample was reduced to 16,380 observations. Table 1 
presents descriptive statistics for the original data retrieved from the 
hospitals. Traveling times to each hospital, computed using the information 
regarding the patients’ address, is also reported.  
 
 Mean S.D. Min. p25 p50 p75 Max. 
𝑦𝑖=a 0.579 0.494 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Age 53.289 19.833 18.000 37.000 53.000 69.000 108.000 
Female 0.540 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Exempt 0.525 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Blue 0.016 0.127 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Green 0.228 0.419 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Yellow 0.640 0.480 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Orange 0.112 0.315 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Red 0.004 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 




8.330 7.947 0.400 3.300 6.333 11.067 250.500 
Time Triage/ 
Examination 
75.906 92.937 0.150 15.100 36.508 103.242 859.333 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for the original data retrieved from the hospitals (16,380 
observations). 
Note: yi = a if chosen hospital is hospital a, yi = b if chosen hospital is hospital b; age = 
number of years of age; female = 1 if female, female = 0 if male; exempt = 1 if exempt from 
copayments, exempt = 0 if non-exempt from copayments. Blue, Green, Yellow, Orange, and 




The median patient is a 53-year-old woman, who is not exempt from 
copayments. She seeks emergency care from hospital a, where she is classified 
as a yellow case in the MTS. Besides facing a 15-minute traveling time, she 
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waits approximately 6 minutes between admission and triage, and another 
36.5 minutes until the first medical observation.  
In order to estimate the conditional logit model, as discussed in section 3, the 
original data was used to derive hospital-specific attributes. 
Traveling times are the shortest period of time, measured in minutes, 
required to travel from the patient’s parish to each hospital. 14  
In the spirit of Sivey (2012), although available, actual waiting times for each 
patient at the hospital they visited are not used. The conditional logit model 
requires the inclusion of waiting times for each hospital in the choice set, and 
the waiting time patients may have waited had they chosen the other hospital 
is unknown. Thus, two measures of waiting times for each hospital were 
constructed instead.  
For the waiting time between admission and triage, the measure of waiting 
time for each patient is the daily median waiting time between admission and 
triage, in the day they demanded emergency care, at each hospital. It is 
assumed that, at the arrival at the hospital site, patients form an expectation 
of the waiting time between admission and triage by assessing the number of 
people in the queue. The daily median is used as oppose to the mean to offset 
the impact of outliers. 
For the waiting time between triage and the first medical observation, the 
measure of waiting time for each patient is the daily median waiting time 
between triage and the first medical observation for the MTS classification 
they received, in the day they demanded emergency care, at each hospital. 
The underlying assumption here is that patients would have received the 
same MTS classification in the two hospitals. The choice of this measure is 
justified on additional grounds.  
                                                 
14 The time needed to travel from the patient’s residence to the hospital was computed using the 
software Google Maps. 
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Firstly, in the entrance of emergency rooms, Portuguese hospitals are obliged 
to announce a measure of the waiting time between triage and first medical 
examination for each MTS classification. Thereforesince this information is 
available to patients at the moment of the choice between staying at the 
hospital they arrived or seeking care from another hospitalit plausible to 
assume that it is factored in the decision process. Further, it is the expectation 
of the waiting time and not its ex-post realization that matters for the utility 
comparison at the moment of choice.  
Secondly, following Sivey (2012), the median is used in opposed to the mean 
to reduce the effect of outlierswhich may be inferred from Table 1. 
According to the discussion of the previous section, each emergency care 
episode is included in the mean computed and made available to patients at 
the hospitals only for two hours. This implies that the effect of extreme values 
of waiting times have a short-lived effect on that measure. Since the dataset 
only allows to compute daily averages of waiting times, the effect of outliers 
would be larger in that average than it is in the set of averages available to 
patients.  As such, it is argued that the daily median is a more accurate proxy 
for the information patients take into account in the moment of choice.  
Finally, for a few patients, mainly classified as blue and red cases, the 
measure of waiting time could not be computed due to the inexistence of 
patients with the same MTS classification in the not chosen hospital in the 
same day. Consequently, the estimation sample was reduced to 16,310 cases 
(patients) and 32,620 observations.  








Shortest period of time, measured in minutes, required to 
travel from the patient’s parish to each hospital. 
medianwaiting1 
Daily median waiting time between admission and triage 
for each hospital. 
medianwaiting2 
Daily median waiting time between triage and the first 
medical observation for each MTS classification at each 
hospital. 
epblue 
Daily number of patients classified as non-urgent in the 
MTS classification  (blue bracelet) at each hospital. 
epgreen 
 
Daily number of patients classified as standard in the MTS 
classification  (green bracelet) at each hospital. 
epyellow  
Daily number of patients classified as urgent in the MTS 
classification  (yellow bracelet) at each hospital. 
eporange 
Daily number of patients classified as very urgent in the 
MTS classification  (orange bracelet) at each hospital. 
epred 
Daily number of patients classified as immediate  in the 
MTS classification  (red bracelet) at each hospital. 
Table 2 Variable description. 
 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimation.  
 
 Mean S.D. Min. p25 p50 p75 Max. 
𝑑𝑖𝑗 0.500 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.000 
age 53.282 19.829 18.000 37.000 53.000 69.000 108.000 
female 0.540 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
exempt 0.475 0.499 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
epblue 4.554 4.139 0.000 1.000 3.000 7.000 18.000 
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epgreen 62.934 31.533 17.000 34.000 58.000 90.000 123.000 
epyellow 176.562 23.749 120.000 159.000 178.000 193.000 230.000 
eporange 30.975 11.362 11.000 21.000 31.000 41.000 56.000 
epred 1.101 1.104 0.000 0.000 1.000 2.000 4.000 
traveling  18.262 8.516 3.000 13.000 17.000 23.000 87.000 
medianwait1 6.599 1.862 2.767 5.167 6.350 7.333 11.183 
medianwait2 45.223 29.757 0.150 29.517 39.600 53.050 417.700 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for the estimation sample (32,620 observations). 
 
The median patient is a 53-year-old woman, who is not exempt from 
copayments.15 Among the two choices, the composition of emergency care 
demand, on the day the median patient seeks treatment, is as follows: 3 blue, 
58 green, 178 yellow, 31 orange, and 1 red cases. Also among the two choices, 
the median patient faces a 17-minute traveling time, waits 6.35 minutes 
between admission and triage and almost 40 minutes until the first medical 
observation. 
In order to estimate the model it is assumed that 𝒙𝑖𝑗 are exogenous to every 
decision-makeri.e., the patient. As Sivey (2012) notes, this is a plausible 
assumption given that the patients are relatively small and numerous 
compared to the hospitals, making the effect of the marginal patient on 
waiting times negligible. In fact, it seems unlikely that an individual patient 
choice of hospital would have an impact in a given hospital’s waiting times. 
However, to control for possible effects of demand on waiting times, the 
number of daily episodes by MTS classification are included in 𝒙𝑖𝑗.  
 
6.2 Preliminary Analysis 
In this subsection, a first data-driven attempt to investigate the link between 
waiting times and the demand for emergency care is carried out. To the extent 
                                                 
15 Note that statistic for patient-specific atributes are naturally unchanged from Table 1. 
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that there is one, the relationship between waiting times and demand might 
not be strictly demand-sided. If it is, as discussed in Sections 1 and 2, waiting 
times assume the role of a demand-curbing mechanism by acting like a 
non-monetary price. All else equal, it is expected that lower waiting times 
lead to increased demand. However, it may be the case that the relationship is 
supply-sided in the sense that waiting times are a result of excess demand. 
That is, waiting times increase because demand is above the hospital’s 
capacity.  
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the traveling and waiting times 
variables for the chosen and not chosen hospital. From the table, no consistent 
pattern between traveling time, waiting time, and choice can be inferred. On 
average, traveling time is shorter for the chosen hospital, waiting times 
between admission and triage are similar, and waiting times until the first 
medical observation are longer in the chosen hospital for except for high 
severity cases (orange and red). Considering the median instead yields 
identical conclusions. This implies that traveling time may be an important 
determinant of hospital choice, while waiting times may not. This type of 
analysis, however, has the significant shortcoming of considering each 
variable individually, which diminishes the validity of its conclusions. 
 
Chosen hospital 
 Mean S.D. Min. p25 p50 p75 Max. 
traveling 16.570 8.220 3.000 12.000 15.000 20.000 87.000 
medianwait1 6.608 1.887 2.767 5.167 6.350 7.333 11.183 
medianwait2 
(blue) 
138.507 110.206 10.600 43.400 90.650 235.367 417.700 
medianwait2 
(green) 




50.033 26.049 24.550 33.400 40.892 56.117 161.892 
medianwait2 
(orange) 
15.734 8.761 4.350 8.850 12.650 20.400 41.767 
medianwait2 
(red) 
16.156 10.771 0.150 8.708 14.350 21.433 39.450 
Not chosen hospital 
traveling 19.954 8.472 3.000 14.000 18.000 25.000 87.000 
medianwait1 6.589 1.837 2.767 5.167 6.350 7.333 11.183 
medianwait2 
(blue) 
120.006 123.960 10.600 32.967 59.000 180.900 417.700 
medianwait2 
(green) 
38.021 14.130 19.300 28.050 33.750 43.800 99.908 
medianwait2 
(yellow) 
49.623 25.617 24.550 33.400 40.892 53.967 161.892 
medianwait2 
(orange) 
18.269 8.257 4.350 12.317 19.000 23.500 41.767 
medianwait2 
(red) 
17.796 11.996 0.150 10.200 16.267 23.350 39.450 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics for traveling and waiting time variables per choice. 
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7. Results and Discussion  
Table 4 presents the results for three specifications of the conditional logit 
model.16  
Specification 1 includes traveling and waiting times as sole explanatory 
variables. The estimates show a statistically significant negative effect of 
traveling and the waiting time between triage and the first medical 
observation on the probability of utilization and a statistically significant 
positive effect of medianwait1. In order to evaluate if these results are biased 
because of a correlation of waiting times and demand factors, a second 
specification that adds the daily number of episodes (patients) by MTS 
classification is estimated. The significance and the sign of the above results 
hold when the daily number of episodes by MTS classificationwhich are 
used to control for the possible correlation between waiting times and overall 
demandare included. However, the absolute value of the coefficient of the 
traveling time variable increases, and the impact of waiting times is reduced 
in a non-trivial manner.  
In order to evaluate whether these results are biased of correlation of waiting 
times with patient-specific characterizes a third specification is estimated. 
Specification 3 includes the traveling and waiting times variables, their 
interactions with patient-specific characteristics, and the daily number of 
episodes by MTS classification. The estimate for the effect of traveling time is 
robust across specifications and actually increases as more variables are 
included in the model. Although marginally, this effect is stronger for older 
patients and offset by copayment exemption, arguably because the total cost 
(monetary and non-monetary) is smaller for exempt patients. On the other 
hand, the sign of the coefficients on the waiting time variables are reversed in 
                                                 
16 The model is estimated in STATA 13 using the clogit command. 
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the last specification. The effect of waiting time between admission and triage 
becomes insignificant, as well as that of its interactions. Besides the change in 
the sign of the effect of medianwait2, its magnitude is considerably small in all 
model specifications. The net effect of traveling and waiting times may be 
further investigated by analyzing the marginal effects reported in Table 5. 
 







× age   -0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
× female   0.0071 
(0.0051) 








× age   
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
× female   -0.0076 (0.0142) 








× age   -0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
× female   0.0004 
(0.0010) 
× exempt   -0.0096*** 
(0.0010) 
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Obs. 32620 32620 32620 
Cases 16310 16310 16310 
Log L -9688.6464 -9547.4357 -9244.0154 
Table 5 Estimation Results. 
Standard errors reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
The estimated marginal effects reveal that traveling time has a robust, 
statistically significant, negative effect on the probability of utilization, while 
confirming that the waiting time between admission and triage is not likely to 
affect demand decisions. As far as the impact of the waiting time between 
triage and the first medical observation is concerned, its net effect turns out to 
be negative, statistically significant, though very close to zero.  
The estimates of Specification 3 imply that a standard deviation increase in 
the waiting time between triage and the first medical observation 
(approximately, 30 minutes) reduces the probability of seeking emergency 
care from a given hospital by 0.009 percentage points, ceteris paribus, which 
suggests that waiting times are a weak determinant of hospital choice. An 
increase of the same magnitude in the traveling time reduces the probability 
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of utilization by 5.841 percentage points, ceteris paribus. Note that, due to the 
inclusion of the daily number of episodes, the marginal effect of medianwait2 
only captures the effect of supply-side induced changes in waiting times, such 
as changes in hospital capacity. 
These results may be due to the nature of emergency carei.e., patients in 
urgent need of medical care are unlikely to forgo treatment even when faced 
with a high time costor to the fact that patients only learn the expectation of 
waiting times at the hospital site, and, once they arrive, traveling to another 
hospital might not be a suitable alternative to most patients. This is consistent 
with the larger effect of traveling times, which may be anticipated by patients 
at a prior point in time. 
 








































Table 6 Marginal Effects at the mean.  
Standard errors reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
 37 
Finally, the goodness of fit of Specification 3 is assessed by cross tabulating 
the predicted,?̂?𝑖, versus actual outcome, 𝑦𝑖, in Table 6. Predicted outcomes are 
defined as: 
 
𝑦?̂? = 𝑎 𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑎) >̂  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑦𝑖 = 𝑏)̂ , (10) 
 
where 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(∙)̂  denotes the estimated probability according to Specification 3. 





𝑦?̂? = 𝑎 𝑦?̂? = 𝑏 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑎 7,950 1,480 9,430 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑏 3,078 3,802 6,880 
Total 11,028 5,282 16,310 




8. Policy Implications  
From a policy standpoint, traveling times have limited relevance. Unless 
when deciding the site of construction of new health care facilitieswhich is 
usually a decision for the very long run that does not happen often, 
policymakers cannot easily influence traveling times.  
According to the results of the previous section, it is the waiting time between 
triage and the first medical observation that matter for patients’ choice. 
Unlike traveling time, waiting times at the hospital site can be subject to 
policy intervention. By expanding medical capacity or increasing efficiency, 
waiting times between triage and the first medical observation might be 
reduced. If the results suggest that such policies would not foster consumer 
welfare a great deal, they also indicate that waiting times are not a suitable 
demand-curbing mechanism, contradicting the literature that assigns them a 
policy role.   
Although the data does not allow for the estimation of consumer surplus, it is 
plausible to admit that changes in waiting times would not have significant 
impact on consumer welfare in the case of emergency care.  It may be the case 
that patients are more tolerant to waiting once they arrive at the hospital site-
possibly, due to a safety feelingor because going to a different hospital is 
not a suitable option for patients in need of emergency care. One way to make 
demand more responsive to waiting times is to make information regarding 
them available to consumers prior to their arrival at the hospital. The 
Portuguese ministry of health has already implemented policies towards that 
goal by making available online the same information on waiting times 
emergency services display at the site.  
Finally, it is important to stress that if data from hospitals with different 
copayments is included, the framework may be used to evaluate the costs 
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imposed on patients by traveling and waiting times, thereby complementing 
cost-benefit analysis of hospital location and emergency care management.    
 40 
9. Concluding Remarks 
In this study, patient choice of emergency care providers in a duopoly setting 
without outside option was analyzed. Placing emphasis on the role of 
hospital-specific attributestraveling and waiting times, a conditional logit 
model was estimated with data from two Portuguese public hospitals. The 
available dataset opened the possibility of dividing waiting times into two 
components: the period between admission and triage and the period 
between triage and the first medical observation. The major conceptual 
challenge, as is common in this type of works, was how to proxy the 
information available to patients regarding waiting times at the moment of 
choice.  
Negative and statistically significant effects of traveling time and the time 
between triage and the first medical observation were found, even when 
controlling for patient-specific characteristics and for correlation between 
waiting times and aggregate hospital demand. The size of the effects, though, 
is quantitatively small, particularly for the measure of waiting time. The fact 
that traveling time seems to matter more than waiting time indicates that the 
former may not beat least, entirelyfactored in by patients at the moment 
of choice, arguably due to lack of information. In turn, this suggests that 
actual choice of emergency care provider might not occur at the hospital site, 
after collecting information that allows patients to form an expectation of the 
waiting time, but before arrival, when only traveling times are anticipated.  
The low responsiveness of the probability of utilization of a given hospital to 
waiting times has somewhat striking policy implications. Both policymakers 
aiming at reducing waiting times in order to foster welfare or, conversely, 
policymakers wishing to use waiting timesas has been long proposed in the 
Health Economics literatureto discourage utilization may fall short of the 
intended goals.  
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It is noteworthy that such results might be motivated by the nature of 
emergency care itself and that they should not be carried over to other 
dimensions of health care provision lightly. Requiring immediate care, 
patients are likely to forgo search and seek treatment from the nearest 
provider or from the provider with which they have a previous or on-going 
relationship.  
Finally, the major shortcomings of the current work are closely related to 
opportunities for further research. The most promising extension would be to 
collect data that allows for the possibility of including a measure of patients’ 
opportunity cost. A common measure would be the hourly salary for 
employed patients. As the burden of waiting is closely related to what is 
sacrificed, controlling for the opportunity cost might provide additional and 
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